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Both the International Monetary Fund and the  *  The Bank and the Fund will have to im-
World Bank recognize that Sub-Saharani  Africa  prove their ability to work together to maximize
represents a difficult and complex development  their effectiveness in the 1990s.  One way to
challenge.  achieve more effective cooperation between the
agencies would be for them to synchronize their
Feinberg proposes that t!ie Bank and the  policies on such issues as resource transfers,
Fund take four institutional steps to  Sal  effec-  commercial debts of middle- and low-income
tively with the region's problems in the near  countries, and economic and political condition-
term:  ality.
T  The agencies should reconsider their  The World Bank and the IMF should col-
planned net capital contribution to help over-  laborate in long-term planning for Sub-Saharan
come the region's severe foreign exchange  Africa.  Policy Framework Papers should go
constraints. A negative resource transfer could  beyond the three-year horizon that current
weaken the influence of the multilateral agencies  procedures now dictate and plan some issues for
and tighten the financial straitjackets already  five to 10 years.
crippling many countries in the region.
The Bank and the Fund should unite in an
* The Brady proposals represented a major  effort to produce strategic plans for the entire
conceptual step forward toward alleviating the  region to guide their own work and to give clear
private debt overhang that seriously burdens at  signals and realistic expectations to the region.
least a dozen countries in the region.  Additional  The nations of Sub-Saharan Africa also should
efforts to reduce the private debts of the low-  play major roles in designing these programs.
income countries will be needed to achieve the
objectives of the proposals.  Collaboration will proceed more smoothly if
one institution clearly has the lead - and, in this
* The Bank's analysis of the problems facing  region, the World Bank rather than the IMF
the region argues for a faster anid  more compre-  should take the lead in organizing extemal
hensive reform program.  In the 1990s the  assistan1ce  effons and policy reform programs.
Bretton Woods agencies will face increasing  Such an approach would be consistent with the
pressures to give more weight to issues of social  1989 decision to give the World Bank primacy
equity and political variables.  over structural matters.
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Introduction
The International  Monetary  Fund  and  World  Bank  are fully  aware  that  Sub-
Saharan  Africa  presents  a daunting  development  challenge. In addition  to the
problems inherent  in this economic development  process, the Bretton Woods
agencies  will themselves  face several  difficult  institutional  issues  that, if
not  properly  handled,  could  seriously  impede  their  ability  to  assist  the  region.
Sirce  both agencies  are likely  to play major  roles in the region's  economies
during  the  1990s,  their  performance  will  be  critically  important  for  all  parties
concerned  with  Africa's  future.
This paper  considers  four institutional  matters  that  will determine  the
efficacy  of the  Fund and  Bank in Africa.  First,  to h6lp overcome  the  region's
severe  foreign  exchange  constraints,  the  Bretton  Woods  agencies  should  reconsider
their  planned  net capital  contribution. For the first  half of the 1990s,  the
International  Development  Association  (IDA)  is  programmed  to  provide  significant
resources,  but  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (IBRD)
and the  IMF  could  well remove  more financial  reflows  than they  provide  in  new
money  if  they  do  not  alter  recent  practices.  A  negative  resource  transfer  could
weaken the influence  of the multilateral  agencies  and tighten  the financial
straightjackets  that are al-.eadv  crippling  so many countries  in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Second,  the  Brady  proposals  were  a  major  conceptual  step forward  toward
alleviating  the  private  debt  overhang  that is a serious  burden  for  at least  a
dozen  Sub-Saharan  African  countries.  So  far,  however,  no Brady-style  deals  have
been closed  in t.he  region.  Nor have the Bretton  Woods agencies  been able to2
normalize  Africa's  external  financial  relations  with commercial  creditors.  A
partial  response  is tho  recent  creation  of a World  Bank  facility  to reduce  the
private  debts  of  the  low-ip,'ome  countries;  this  creative  use  of  IBRD  profits  will
have to  be supplemented  with additional  funds  if its  laudable  objectives  are  to
be obtained.
Third,  the  World  Bank  has correctly  recognized  that  policy-based  lending
programs  should  be more  selective  in  their  key  policy  targets.  At the  same  time,
the  Bank's  own  radical  analysis  of  the  problems  fac4ng  Sub-Saharan  Africa  suggest
a more comprehensive  and rapid  reform  program.  '7rthermore,  in the 1990s  the
Bretton  Woods  agencies  will  face  pressures  from  various  quarters  to  give  greater
weight to considerations  of social equity and to take into account such
"political"  variables  as the quality  of economic  governance,  administrative
probity,  and fundamental  human  rights.  Conditionality,  therefore,  threatens  to
become  more  ambitious  and  broader  rather  than  more realistic  and  narrower.
Finally,  if the  Bank and  the  Fund  are  to  maximize  their  effectiveness  in
the 1990s,  they  will  have to improve  their  ability  to  work together.  They  will
have to struggle  to synchronize  their  policies  on  all these  issues  --  resource
transfers  and  arrears,  commercial  debts  of the  middle  and  low-income  countries,
and  economic  and  political  conditionality.  Such  Bank-Fund  collaboration  should
occur  in the  context  of long-term  strategic  planning  exercises  for  Sub-Saharan
Africa.
I.  Resource  transfers
In the  first  half of  the  1990s,  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  as a  group
intend  to provide  a positive  net resource  transfer  to Sub-Saharan  Africa.  But
this  aggregate  contribution  masks  sharp  differences  among  the  agencies. IDA  is3
planning  a positive  net transfer  of over $3 billion  per year during  1991-94
(table  1).  Under its  current  policy  plans,  the IBRD  will make disbursements
approximately  equal to anticipated  principal  and interest  repayments,  thus
yielding  little  if any net trarnsfer.  It is difficult  to predict future  IMF
flows,  in  part  because  the  number  of future  stand-bys  is inevitably  unknown  but
also  because  the  IMF  refuses  to release  repayment  schedules  by country  or even
by region.  But during  the second  half of the 1980s,  purchases  declined  and
repurchases  rose  sharply.  Consequently,  the  Fund  drained  money  from  Sub-Saharan
Africa,  the  average  annual  negative  transfer  reaching  nearly  $700  million  during
1985-89  (table  2).
The  World  Bank's  projections  may  be  optimistic  with  regard  to  disbursement
schedules. Countries  may  well  prove  unable  to  meet the  condit.ons  attached  to
quick-disbursing  structural  adjustment  loans,  and  fiscal  stringency  may  prevent
governments  from  moving  forward  with  Bank-supported  investment  projects.  Indeed,
even  under  this  most optimistic  scenario,  four  Sub-Saharan  Africin  countries  -
- Botswana,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Liberia  and  Mauritius  --  are  projected  to encounter
negative  resource  transfers  to the  WTorld  Bank (IBRD  plus  IDA)  of  $50  million  or
more during the 1991-94  period.  Moreover,  seven other countries  which are
projected  to experience  positive  overall  flows  from  the  World  Bank  will suffer
negative  transfers  to the  IBRD  in excess  of $50  million:  Ghana,  Kenya,  Malawi,
Mauritania,  Senegal,  Tanzania  and  Zambia.
In order  to augment  the financial  contribution  of the  IBRD,  it might  be
wise to reconsider  the amortization  schedule  of both new and old loans.  If
granted across the board to all low-income  countries,  a retroactive  terms
adjustment  (RTA)  of principal  repayment  terms  on old IBRD loans  could improve
the  debtors'  cash flow  without  involving  the  World  Bank in  Paris  Club  or other4
formal  debt  rescheduling  exercises. Such  an arrangement  could  be orchestrated
without  impairing  the  present  value  of IBRD  loan  assets  or damaging  its  credit
rati.g  on  world  apital  markets  any  more than  previous  adjustments  in repay.nent
terms  have done.'
The World Bank should  continue  to resist  voices  that ask it to give  up
its  preferred  creditor  status  and engage  in the reduction  of its  own assets.
So long  as the  World  Bank (IBRD  plus  IDA)  is providing  net  flows,  it should  be
under  no financial  or moral obligation  to grant its  own debt reduction. Noi
would  such  debt  reduction  necessarily  be equitable,  since  it wolnld  come  at the
expense  of other  developing-country  borrowers,  unless  Vhe  industrial  countries
were  willing  to offset  losses  through  additional  contributionq.
The IMF  has sought  to improve  its resource  transfer,  and to reduce  the
cost of its credits  to low-income  countries,  through  the SAF/ESAF  mechanism.
Yet  most African countries have not yet  availed themselves  of  the ESAF
opportunity. As of December  31, 1990,  only 11 nations  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
had gained  access  to ESAF r.  sources  (more  generally,  only SDR 1.4 billion  of
the  SDR  4.6  billion  of total  available  ESAF  resources  had  been committed,  see
table  3). The  sticking  point  has  been  the  onus  of  conditionality:  a  large  number
of countries  that  had SAF  agreements  have simply  been unwilling  to enter  into
stringent  three-year  commitments.  When  the  ESAF  was  initiated,  Fund  management
emphasized  that the resources  would  only  be used to support  strong  adjustment
programs. Evidsnt'Ly  the  Fund  has  honored  this  commitment.
1 The relative  weight  of the  variables  that influence  the  IBRD's  credit
rating  is a  matter  of some  dispute.  For  an argument  that  emphasizes  capital
subscription  and  retained  earnings,  see  Charles  R. Blitzer,  "Financing  the
World Bank"  in  Richard  E. Feinberg,  ed.,  Between  Two  Worlds:  The  World  Bank's
Next  Decade.  Washington,  D.C.:  Transaction  Books  and  the  Overseas  Development
Council,  1989.5
The dilemma  with the ESAF mechanism  as it stands  arises  from its twv,
conflicting  objectives:  to catalyze  tough  adjustment  programs  and to transfer
concessional  resources  to low-income  nations. While  the  tension  between  these
twin  objectives  of adjustment  and  financing  runs  throughout  Fund  (and  many  Bank)
programs,  in the  case of ESAF it is especially  acute )ecause  the  program  was
clearly  designed  to  provide  enhanced  resources  to  very  poor  nations,  Indeed,  if
ESAF  funds  continue  to lie  fallow,  IDA  proponents  may  argue  that  the  scarce  ODA
resources  should  be transfered  to the  World  Bank.
One approach  that  has been suggested  to ease  access  to ESAF  resources  is
to establish  a two-tier  conditionality  system.  The lower-tier  program  might
focus  on macroeconomic  management  and a narrower  range  of structural  reforms,
and yield a lower  percentage  of quota than  would  be available  under  a full-
fledged  comprehensive  ESAF reform  peckage. 2 As Joan Nelson  has argued,  such
two-tier  conditionality  does not imply  softer  conditionality.  "Indeed,  it is
the existing  pattern  that  erodes  the  credibility  of conditionality  by setting
often  unrealistically ambitious conditions.... Reserving more  demanding
conditions  for the  higher tier of more vigorous  and capable  reformers  would
similarly  restore  the  integrity  of the  process.n3
Above  all,  the  future  availability  of  rund  resources  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa
will be a function  of access  policy,  which determines  the amounts  of money
2.  Percy  Mistry  suggests  using  ESAF  monies  to assure  a zero  net  transfer
to such  debt-distressed  countries.  See  Percy  S.  Mistry,  African  Debt:  The  Case
for  Relief  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Oxford:  Oxford  International  Associates,
1988,  p. 46. Two-tier  conditionality  has also  been  proposed,  in  broader
contexts,  by Joan  Nelson  and  C. David  Finch. See  Nelson,  Fragile  Coalitions:
The Politics  of Economic  Adjustment.  Washington,  D.C.:  Transaction  Books  and
the  Overseas  Development  Council,  1989,  pp.18-22;  and  Finch,  "An  IMF  Debt
Plan,"  The  International  Economy,  Vol. 3,  No.  2 (March-April,  1989),  Pp.89-91.
3.  Nelson,  Ibid.,  p.21.6
members are permitted  to borrow  under various circumstances. This critical
policy issue will be reviewed  in the wake of the ra3cent  50 percent iuota
increase.  Access policy  should  not cake away with one hand what the quota
increase  is offering  with the  other:  the  net affect  of the  quota  increase  and
access  policy  decisions  should  be to increase  the potential  availability  of
resources  to countries  undertaking  reform  programs.
Arrears  and  the  Fund
The  arrears  issue  is  also  a question  of resource  transfer.  For countries
without acceptable  reform  programs,  arrears  have been a way to reduce the
resource  transfer  to  the  Fund  (Africa's  net  resource  transfer  to  the  Fund  during
the second half of the 1980s would have been even larger  were it not for
arrears).  Even  countries  with reform  programs  face  a negative  transfer  to the
IMF so long as they are obliged  to make payments  to the Fund  before  becoming
eligible  for fresh IMF resou. 4 rces, unless the Fund immediately  mobilizes  an
offsetting  stream  of credit.
Of the 9 countries  with arrears  to the  IMF  at the  end of 1990,  five  are
in Sub-Saharan  Africa (Liberia,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia,  Sudan,  and  Zambia,  see
table  4). In three  cases --  the  Sudan,  Zambia,  and  to a lesser  degree  Liberia
--  the  arrears  are  large  and  have  been outstanding  since  1984-86.
Initially,  the IMF sought  to unclog the arrears  bottleneck  by asking
bilateral  donors  to provide  "support"  funds  that  would  enable  debtors  to clear
their  arrears  and  proceed  with stabilization  programs. With the  assistance  of
other countries  in the Western  Hemisphere,  Guyana  and Honduras  successfully
cleared  their  arrears  with  the  Fund  in  June,  1990. Nonetheless,  tie  nine  other
cases of protracted  arrears,  including  all of those in Sub-Saharan  Africa,7
remained  unresolved. Bilateral  donors  proved  reluctant  to step  forward  to take
out another  creditor  that itself  seemesd  unwilling  to risk fresh resources.
Moreover, by  excluding itself from  arranging stand-bys, the  Fund  had
inadvertently  deprived  other  potential  eonors  of the  comfort  of  a  well-designed
and  monitored  adjustment  program  in the  debtor  nation.
In April, 1990,  the Interim  Committ__-  decided  to apply a new Orights"
approach  to  the  seemingly  intractable  arrearage  problem.  Under  this  arrangement,
the  IMF  will  stand  ready  to  help construct  and  monitor  a  medium-term  adjustment
program  even  in  the  presence  of  protracted  arrears. The  debtor  nation  will  only
have to  clear  its  accumulated  arrears  to the  Fund  at  the  end  of the  program,  and
will  be assisted  in doing  so  by being  eligible  to thereafter  (pending  approval
of the IMF of the successor  adjustment  program)  encash  the  purchase  'rights"
accumulated  during  the  "shadow"  program.  ESAF  fua.,ds  will also  be available  for
eligible  members.' However,  countries  will  be expected  to  make  payments  to  the
IMF  falling  due during  the  probationary  period
The  "rights"  strategy  has the  virtue  of  freeing  the  Fund  to  reengage  with
previously  estranged  members. Also,  instead  of expecting  other  donors  to  clear
the  stock  of arrears  to the  Fund,  the  new  policy  more  realistically  calls  upon
the  Fund  to  use its  own  resources  for that  purpose. But the  "rights"  approach
still  suffers  from  soveral  weaknesses.  It  excludes  explicit  writedowns  or other
forms  of  IMF-financed  relief,  i.e.,  from  resources  generated  through  SDR  issuance
or  gold sales, other than the concessional  rescheduling  inherent in the
substitution  of  ESAF  money  for  ordinary  resources.  Tnus,  it  remains  unclear  how
countries  with  very large  arrears  in relation  to export  capacity  will ever  be
4.  The  IMF  agreed  to pledge  up to 3  million  ounces  of gold as additional
security  for  use of ESAF  resources  in  connection  with financing  of accumulated
rights.8
able  to  regain  their  membership  rights.  At the  sawe  time,  the  recent  IMF  decision
to  build  a SDR  1  billion  contingency  reserve  facilirates  future  leniency,  should
the  Fund decide  that  under  certain  strict  criteria  it  would  be better  to grant
some relief than to permanently  marginalize  members from the international
monetary  system.
A second  problem is that the "rights"  approach  would seem to lay down
unusually  rough  sequencing  of  policy  performance  and  finalcial  programn.ing.  The
member  state  must not only  agree  to enter  into  a three-year  program,  but must
also complete  it successfully,  and enter  into  a successor  arra.,ement,  before
gaining access to IMF resourcesl  Such heavy front-loading  would seem to
establish conditions  even more demanding  than tnose that have limited the
effectiveness  of the  ESAF.
Most importantly,  while  performance  requirements  are front-  loaded  the
funding  schedule  is  in  effect  back-loaded.  During  the  program  the  member  country
receives  no  new  IMF  resources  while  it  is  expected  to  make  payments  on  old  debts
--  that  is,  the  resource  transfer  to  the  Fund  will  be  negative  during  the  reform
years.  This is the opposite  of the fundamental  theory  underlying  all Fund
standbys:  that  purchases  are  released  during  the  program  in  order  to  facilitate
adjustment. The Fund  might  hope that other  donors  will provide  resources  to
support  the  adjustment  program,  but this  is typically  the  case during  a normal
stand-by  as  well.  Paradoxically,  the  Fund  is  breaking  with its  standard  policy
of linking  financing  and adjustment  precisely  in those countries  which find
themselves  in the  most desperate  circumstances.  While  the  Fund  understandably
might  seek  tighter  assurances  of  performance  _.lom  countries  with  very  poor  track
records,  this  approach  beems  to  go  too  far  and  to  be  potentially
counterproductive.  And  while  !.t  is  natural  for  a  creditor  to  adopt  a  "sanctions'9
approach  to  wayward  debtors,  the  actual  nine  arrears  cases  have  suffered  enough
to  appreciate  the  disastrous  consequences  of imprudent  macroeconomic  policies.
In  sum,  the  "rights"  approach  is  a step  forward  towards  zeintegrating  the
protracted  arrears  members  back into  the  fold.  Nonetheless,  like the  earlier
"support  group"  strategy,  it  may  well respond  to the  needs  o:^  some  debtors  but
is  unlikely  to  meet  the  circumstances  of  others. If  that  proves  to  be the  case,
more flexible  and innovative  arrangements  should  be conisidered.
II.  The Bretton  Woods  Agencies  and  Private  Debt
Considerable  progress  has  been  made in  addressing  the  debts  owed  by Sub-
Saharan  Africa  to official,  bilateral  agencies. 5 Less  progress,  however,  has
been  realized  in dealing  with  the  debts  owed  to  private  creditors.  While  these
obligations  eccount  for  a lesser  percentage  of the  region's  total  debts  than  is
the  case  for  Latin  America,  the  burden  is  more  significant  than  is  often  assumed.
Debts  owned  to  private  creditors  account  for  28  percent  of Sub-Saharan  Africa's
total  long-term  debt-.  If  one  includes  short-term  debts,  the  percentage  owed  to
private  creditors  rises  to  about  34  percent.- 1rivate  debts  account  for  over  20
percent  of the long-term  debt of twelve  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  (Benin,
Cameroon, Congo, Guinea-Bi.ssau,  Cote  d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya,  Maulritius,
Mozambique,  Niger,  Nigeria,  and  Zimbabwe),  and  for  over 30 percent  for six  of
these  (Benin,  Congo,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Gabon,  Nigeria,  and  Zimbabwe,  see  table  5).
5. For  an analysis  of the  "Toronto  terms"  for  official  bilateral
reschedulings,  see  World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables  1989-90,  Washington,DC:  World
Bank,  Volume  1, pp. 47-48.
6. World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tales  1989-90. Washington,DC:  World  Bank,
1989,  Volume  I, pp.82-85. Short-term  private  credits  are  derived  as the
difference  between  short-term  debt  and  interest  arrears  on long-term  debt
outstanding.10
Moreover,  these  private  credits  carry  interest  rates  whose  average  terms  are  more
than double those of official creditors.  Thus, the contractual  service
obligations  on  commercial  debt  are  a serious  burden  for  at  least  a  dozen  African
nations.
Many  African  coun-ries  are  not  servicing  their  debts  to  private  creditors
and are accumulating  arrears.  While  the cash flow result  may be the same  as
would result from an organized restructuring,  this abnormal international
financial  situation  weakens  domestic  confidence,  makes  macroeconomic  management
more difficult,  increases  the  cost of trade  finance,  and  discourages  possible
alternative  sources  of external  capital. It may also  undermine  the  authority
of  debtor-creditor  relations  within  the  afflicted  nation.  For  all  these  reasons,
a normalization  of  private  arrears  would  be most  beneficial.
A  number  of countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  have been declared  eligible
for  a Brady-style  reduction  of debts  to commercial  banks,  but so far  no deals
have  been closed. Lengthy  discussions  between  the  Ivory  Coast  and  Nigeria  and
their  respectively  creditor  banks  had  not  borne  fruit  as  of this  writing.  Other
countries  wait in limbo,  as banks  either  give them low  priority  or prefer  to
avoid  precedent-setting  deals  that  would  involve  inevitably  very  deep  discounts
off the  original  face  ve-lue  of loans.
The World Bank has sought to provide a partial answer for low-income
countries  (per  capita  income  under  $580)  which  are  eligible  to  receive  only  IDA
monies.  In  June,  1989,  the  World  Bank  Board  decided  to  devote  up to  $100  million
in  IBRD  profits  to  the  reduction  of  commercial  debts  of  IDA-only  countries.  Most
of the facility's  debt reduction operations  are expected to involve cash
buybacks,  although  it  might  also  collateralize  debt  exchanges. To  participate,
a country must have an approved  medium-term  adjustment  program and be the11
recipient  of  substantial  debt  relief  from  bilateral  creditors  as  well. The  debt
reduction deal  should also materially enhance the  country's growth and
development  prospects.7
To date, the commercial  debts  of most IDA-only  countries  have not been
actively  traded  on secondary  markets. Those  inter-bank  swaps  that  have  occured
have  typically  registered  deep  discounts  varying  from  50  up  to  95  percent. Thus,
even  assuming  a  favorable  average  discount  of  80  percent,  the  new  facility's  $100
million could retire  only $500 million in debts.  If the Bank succeeds  in
mobilizing  other donors  to provide  equal contributions,  up to $1 billion in
private debts might conceivably  be erased.  Yet  the public and publicly
guaranteed  medium and long-term  commercial  debt owed by IDA-only  countries
exceeds  $11  billion. 8 Even subtracting  suppliers'  credits,  debt to financial
markets  still  approaches  $9  billion,  although  a substantial  portion  of this  may
be L  entually  absorbed  by official  insurance  agencies. Even  so,  the  remaining
commercial  exposure  of  IDA-only  countries  will  substantially  exceed  $1  billion.
Tberefore,  if the  Bank demonstrates  its  ability  to  utilize  this initial
$100  million,  the  IBRD  should  consider  supplementary  financing  for  this  highly
efficient  use of Bank  resources.  A deeper  pool of resources  would also  permit
some  relaxation  of the $10  million  per country  ceiling.  Future  contributions
will,  of course,  depend  on the  continued  profitability  of the  IBRD;  if there  is
any trade-off  between reducing  IBRD lending  margins and the availability  of
funds  to replenish  this debt  reduction  facility,  the  pressing  filwncial  needs
7.  As of  August,  1990,  no such  deals  had  been  concluded,  but  three
countries --  Bolivia, Mozambique, and Niger --  were negotiating World Bank-
financed  buybacks.
8.  World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables  1988-89. Washington,  DC:  World  Bank,
1988.12
of the  world's  poorest  nations  argue  in  favor  of  maintaining  this  modest  tax  on
middle-income  countries.
A more  comprehensive  solution  to the  commercial  debt  problems  of all  Sub-
Saharan  African  countries,  including  the  middle-income  ones,  remains  illusive.
The March, 1989 proposals  of U.S. Secretary  of the Treasury  Nicholas  Brady
legitimized  the  concept  of debt reduction  as w-11 as the  use of the resources
of  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  to  reduce  commercial  debts. But  implementation
has  been  painfully  slow:  only  four  deals  --  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  Costa  Rica,
and  Venezuela  --  were  negotiated  by August,  1990,  none  of them  being in  Africa.
Two  key  problems  have been the  lack  of clarity  with regard  to criteria  for  the
amount  of debt  reduction  and the  absence  of a strong  coordinating  mechanism  to
push  deals  to concldsion.  At present,  no powerful  public  coordinator  exists  to
guarantee  compliance  from a financial  community  of such diverse  interests  and
wide geographic  spread.
Ideally,  either  the IMF  or the  World  Bank,  or a combination  of the two,
would be empowered  by the major creditor  nations to inject  more order into
developing  country  finance. With such  a  mandate,  these  institutions  would  then
work  towards  the  clear  strategic  objective  of  making  each  country's  debt  service
conform  to a payment  stream  consistent  with sustained  adjustment  and growth.
First,  they  would estimate  a nation's  financial  requirements  over the medium
term,  an  exercise  that  the  Bretton  Woods  agencies  already  perform  internally  for
many  borrowers. These  calculations  of debtors'  financial  needs  would  have to
be as objective  as possible,  free from political  intrusions,  and be firmly
endorsed  by key industrial-country  governments. Once these  projections  were
accepted,  the  empowered  agency  or agencies  would  actively  engage  the  commercial
banks,  working  with  creditor  governments  to  orchestrate  compliance.  Banks  would13
have  the  right  to choose  voluntarily  among  a  menu  of options,  but  not  to choose
non-participation. 9
Such an approach  of "guided  voluntarism"  will only be possible  if the
major shareholders  of the Bretton  Woods agencies  will it to be so. In the
meantime,  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  should  continue  their  practice  of lending  into
arrears. To do otherwise  would  be to  unduly  augment  the  leverage  of  commercial
banks  who in the  main have lost interest  in most developing  countries,  and to
deprive  those  member  countries  of  badly  needed  advice  and finance.
III.  Conditionality
Policy-based  lending  was central  to the operation  of both the Bank and
Fund  during  the  1980s. The  Bank  devoted  about  a quarter  of its  loan  commitments
to this  broadened  effort  to  persuade  governments  to alter  fundamental  economic
policies. The IMF of course  has always  provided  balance  of payments  loans  in
support of policy reforms,  but  in the 1980s gave increasing  emphasis to
structural  reforms  embedded  in longer  term  programs. In  Africa  in particular
the  Bretton  Woods  agencies  attempted  to combine  forces  to  alter  the  fundamental
structures  of borrowers'  economies.
In the  1990s,  the  Bank  and  Fund  plan  to continue  their  broad-based  attack
on  Sub-Saharan  Africa's  existing  economic  policies. At issue  is  the  appropriate
comprehensiveness  and tempo of reforms.  In addition,  both agencies  have
indicated  an intention  to place greater  emphasis  on equity --  a factor  which
could  further  complicate  both  the  politics  and  economics  of  policy-based  lending.
9.  For  a fuller  treatment,  see  Catherine  Gwin  and  Richard  E. Feinberg,
Pulling  Together:  The  International  Monetary  Fund  in a  Multipolar  World.
Washington,  D.C.:  Transaction  Books  and  the  Overseas  Development  Council,
1989.14
Moreover,  pressure  is growing  in donor  nations  to add  political  conditions  to
the  financial  assistance  of the  Bretton  Woods  institutions.
Pace of Economic  Reforms
Policy-based  lending --  whether by the Bank or Fund  --  produced mixed
results  in  Africa,  as  elsewhere,  during  the  1980s. There  were  many examples  of
progress. But programs  were often overly ambitious,  encompassing  too many
objectives  to be implemented  in too  brief a period  of time.  Projections  were
sometimes  based on assumptions  about the availability  of external  finance  or
the  response  of  domestic  investors  which  even  at the  time  should  have  been seen
as  excessively  optimistic.  Moreover,  financially-strapped  governments  too  often
felt  compelled  to  sign  loan  agreements  even  though  they  were  not  fully  committed
to them.
The World Bank  has at times  agreed  that it should  reduce  the number  of
issues  addressed  in  policy-based  loans. 10 It may  be desirable  to provide  some
detail  within  a chosen  sector  or sectors,  so that  the  mere  number  of proposed
reforms  is  not  necessarily  a guide  to the  feasibility  of  a  program. But  overly
ambitious  programs  which  include  a large  number  of reforms  across  a  wide range
of problems  are  likely  to flounder  (and  may also  prove  difficult  to assess  if
the  program  is  partially  implemented).  The  civil  service  in  most  African  nations
has  been historically  unable  to coordinate  and implement  a  wide range  of  major
reforms  simultaneously.  Governments  with narrow  political  bases also  hesitate
to tackle  numerous  riforms  at once  for fear  of stirring  up a hornets'  nest of
. For  example,  see  World  Bank,  Adiustment  Lending:  An Evaluation  of Ten
Years  of Experience,  Washington,  DC:  World  Bank,  1988. Tne  conventional
wisdom  also  holds  that  the  "integrated  rural  development'  strategies  of the
1970s  were too  complex  and  demanding.15
offended  interests  that could coalesce  into a powerful  opposition. Finally,
though  public  opinion  may  be  willing  to  accept  or even  enthusiastically  endorse
select reforms (such as lower tariffs that benefit consumers  or selective
privatizations  which promises  better services),  it may oppose full-fledged
liberalization  which seems  to threaten  key concepts  regarding  the role  of the
nation  state  or the  distribution  of  power  and  wealth  among  social  classes.
Consequently,  sector  loans  rather  than full-blown  structural  adjustment
loans (SALs)  will often  be more in keeping  with the ability  or intentions  of
African  governments.  Whereas  sector  loans  may  be associated  with  macroeconomic
policy  conditions,  their overall  breadth is much narrower  than full-fledged
SALs.  Even sector  loans  can  strain  the  political  and administrative  capacities
of states,  and the energies  required  to revamp  such sectors  as agriculture,
industry,  the  fiscal  budget,  or education  should  not  be minimized. Recognizing
such  limitations,  the  World  Bank  has  correctly  been  placing  greater  emphasis  on
the  more narrowly  focused  sector  adjustment  loLns  (SECALs),  as opposed  to the
comprehensive  SALs,  and  should  continue  to do so.
But the  key to success  in  policy  based lending  is not just in reducing
and  strearalining  the  reform  package,  but in  making  sure  that  it  unfolds  within
an  adequate  time  sequence.  The  short  to  medium  term  time  horizon  of  many  African
governments,  as well as of I14F  and World Bank teams,  has often resulted  in
program  designs  which  compressed  reforms  into  an  unrealistically  brief  timetable.
The  pressure  for  quick  results  is  one  explanation  for  the  incorporation  of  overly
optimistic  assumptions  regarding  the likely  availability  of external  finance,
as well as the  domestic  supply  response.  No one  should  therefore  be surprised
when domestic investment  remains  depressed  in the face of sharp,  prolonged
contractions  of  domestic  demand  and  a  seemingly  endless  foreign  exchange  crisis.16
The  ill-fated  Zambia  program  of  the  mid-1980s,  for  example,  harboured  excessively
optimistic  assumptions  regarding  the  responsiveness  of foreign  investment,  and
was blind to the negative  ramifications  of the overwhelming  debt overhang.
Understandably,  the  incompleted  reform  package  was  eventually  jettisoned  by the
Zambian government.  In the end, as many at the Fund and Bank have come to
realize,  it  is  wiser  to  match  the  time  span  allowed  for  implementation,  and  the
frequency  of donor  assessments,  to the  nature  of the  reforms  in question."1
The  sobering  experiences  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  during  the  1980s  would  thus
seem  to  suggest  modesty,  rather  than  haste,  in  reform  proposals.  Yet, the  World
Bank's  major  blueprint  for  African  development,  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  From Crisis
to Sustainable  Growth:  A  Long-Term  Perspective  Study,  appears  to point  in the
opposite  direction  --  toward  more  radical,  comprehensive,  and  rapid  reform.  This
important  report,  which offers  such  devastating  critiques  of African  policies
and  such  all-encompassing  solutions  to  a  wide  range  of  problems,  is  by no means
a document  of  caution.  Indeed,  its  basic  thrust  would  seem  to suggest  even  more
ambitious  conditionality.
The ideal  synthesis  would  seem  to  be for  a government  to reach  agreement
on a comprehensive  radical  reform  program,  and then  to  proceed  to implement  it
step-by-step.  Initially,  it might tackle  the most destructive  distortions,
including  any  major  fiscal  imbalances,  which  must  be  removed  if  the  entire  vision
is to be realized.  Such fundamental  reforms  might  be combined  with measures
which threaten  to provoke relatively  little  political  opposition  but which
promise to please  some sectors.  Some administratively  complex  or politically
For  an early  discussion  of this  issue,  See  Richard  E. Feinberg,
"An  Open  Letter  to the  World  Bank's  New  President,"  Between  Two
Worlds:  The  World  Bank's  Next  Decade,  Washington,  DC:  Transaction
Books  and  the  Overseas  Development  Council,  1986,  pp. 11-14.17
difficult measures, including  many admittedly  important matters involving
institution-building  and  human  capital development, could  be  undertaken
gradually. In  ail  cases,  ultimate  decisions  on  sequencing  and  timing  will  have
to  be tailored  to the  realities  of each  country.
The  problem  is that  the  conditions  required  for  this  ideal  synthesis  are
oft-n  absent. It assumes  a government  which  has a long-term  strategic  vision
and is  unified  enough  to  avoid  the  inevitable  efforts  by those  whose  interests
are  damaged  by the  reform  process  to regroup  and impair  its  success.  It also
assumes  regime  continuity.  Some  of  the  new  Eastern  Europe  democracies  may  enjoy
such unity of vision and mass backing,  but most African societies  have not
experienced  such  a sharp  break  with the  past.
Thus,  in  most  African  countries,  donors  and  governments  are  going  to  have
to make choices  among  the  many reforms  proposed  in the Long-Term  Perspective
Study.  Program  priorities  should  be politically  feasible  and be based on
realistic  assumptions  regarding  the  administrative  capacity  of  governments  and
the  likely  response  rates  of  producers  and  investors.  Above  all, for  any  reform
agenda  to succeed,  the  African  government  must feel  that  it  "owns"  the  program.
The  design  of adjustment  programs  should  be the  result  of dialogue,  not  dictat,
as  actions  taken  primarily  because  of  externally  imposed  conditions  rather  than
domestic  convictions  are  unlikely  to  be sustained.
It is important  to recognize  that  while  some  of the  convention  wisdom  of
the  economics  profession  is gaining  ground  in  Africa  and  in  many  other  parts  of
the world, this is not 'the end of history."  Economists  are in widespread
agreement  on some  critical  matters,  such  as the  need  for  responsible  fiscal  and
monetary  policies,  expanded  savings  and  investment,  and  supply-side  restructuring
toward  tradable  goods  through  realignment  of prices  and  other incentives.  But18
much less is known about  the dynamics  of economic  adjustment,  the timing  and
phasing  of  retorms  --  about  how  to get  from  here to  there. Eccnomists  are  even
less  prepared  to  advise  individual  nations  as  to  what  political  roads  to  follow
and what institutional  mechanisms  to build.  Furthermor-,  key development
choices,  such as income  distribution,  the  role of government,  the  composition
of  taxes,  and  the  structure  of  the  educational  system,  are  heavily  political  and
must  be carefully  thought  out  for  country-specific  application.
Social  Equity
Both the Bank and the Fund  have been stating  with increasing  frequency
that  their  programs  should  take  into  account  the  social  costs  of  adjustment.  As
IMF  Managing  Director  Michel  Camdessus  has affirmed:
"macroeconomic  policies  can  have strong  effects  on the
distribution  of incomes  and thus  on social  equity  and
welfare.  A responsible  adjustment  program  must take
these  effects  into  account,  particularly  as  they  impinge
on  the most vulnerable or disadvantaged  groups of
society.  " 2
Poverty  alleviation  and  equity  are  thus  officially  sanctioned  objectives,
and many adjustment  programs now include  measures aimed at improving the
distributional  impact  of government  interventions  (for example,  by reducing
subsidies  to the  middle  classes  and  more carefully  targeting  social  -programs)
and at compensating  those who must inevitably  siffer  during the adjustment
process  (by  providing  severance  payments,  public  works  employment,  and  nutrition
programs).  Yet  these welfare objectives  remain secondary to  efficiency
objectives  in  the  policy-based  lending  programs  of the  Bretton  Woods  age%icies.
12.  "The  IMF's  Support  for  Growth-Oriented  Adjustment  in  Africa,"  remarks
before  the  U.S. Chamber  of Commerce,  Washington,  D.C.,  March  26,  1990,
reprinted  in IMF  Survev,  April  2, 1990,  p.108.19
Should  equity  (or  poverty  alleviation)  be a  key  condition  of policy-based
lending  and a determinant  of tranche  disbursement?  Should  enough  weight  be
given  to  equity  objectives  so  that  if  a government's  policies  are  grossly  unjust
(however  defined),  its  access  to policy-based  loans  would suffer?
The  authors  of the  1990  Worla  Development  Report  on  poverty  answer  in  the
affirmative.  They argue  that  "External  assistance  should  be more  tightly  linked
to an assessment  of the  efforts  that  would-be  recipients  are  making  to reduce
poverty,  ,"
3 urging  that  countries  where  policies  are inconsistent  with  efforts
to reduce  poverty  should  receive  only  "moderate"  quantities  of aid targeted  at
highly  vulnerable  groups.  In the past, the World Bank has tended  to measure
poverty alleviation  in a project-based  fashion,  attempting  to assess what
proportion  of  project  benefits  accrued  directly  to the  poor.  The  authors  of the  E
World  Development  Report  suggest  an  economy-wide  approach  for  the  future,  wherein
government  policies  as  a  whole  would  be evaluated  in terms  of their  impact  upon
the  poor.  Indeed,  the  most recent  replenishment  of IDA  stressed  the  importance
of  poverty  criteria  in allocating  the  organization's  resources.14
Poverty  allev ition  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  during  the  1990s  will  not  be an
easy task.  As the aoove-mentioned  'World  Bank  study  asserts,  even to hold the
number  of  poor at the  1985  level  will  require  a  massive  effort.' 5 This  effort,
the  Bank staff concludes,  must  involve not  only more effective foreign
assistance,  but also comprehensive  domestic  reforms  in industry,  agriculture,
infrastructure,  and social  services  --  in sum,  virtually  the  entire  gambit  of
13.  World  Bank,  1990  World  Develo2ment  Regort:  Poverty.  Oxford:  Oxford
University  Press  for  the  World  Bank,  1990,  p. 4.
14  Ibid,  p. 134.
15.  Ibid,  p.5.20
political  economy.
Political  Conditionality
The  politioal  conditionality  being  written  into  the  charter  of  the  Eurcpean
Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  will open a pandora's  box that the
Bretton Woods agencies  will not be able to escape.  Sooner or later, the
commitment  in the  EBRD charter  to "the fundamental  principles  of multi-party
democracy,  the  rule  of law, (and)  respect  for  human  rights"  is likely  to spill
over  to the  other  multilateral  lending  institutions.  Moreover,  the  increasing
pressures  for  political  change  within  African  societies,  and  the  distress  among
donors  with the  quality  of  governance  in  many  African  countries,  will  force  the
Bretton  Woods  agencies  to consider  more directly  the  political  milieu  in  which
they  operate.
Historically,  several  factors  inhibited  donors  from pressing  political
conditionality  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  East-West  geopolitical  rivalries  often
took precedence  over the niceties  of human rights  and domestic  governance.
Underlying  ethnic tensions in many African countries  lent credence to the
argument  that  only a strong,  single-party  state  could  preserve  narional  unity
and  prevent  tribal  bloodshed  (which,  it  was  feared,  the  Soviets  would  exploit).
And  economic  efficiency  was associated  with  centralized  political  power.
Today,  these inhibitory  factors  are less compelling.  With the dramatic
shift  in Soviet  domestic  and  foreign  policies  and  the  sudden  decline  in Soviet
interest  in most Third  World regions,  the  West is less worried  that African
regimes  may align  with a hostile  global  rival.  And  while ethnic,  regional,  or
religious  cleavages  certainly  remain  factors  to take  into  account,  they  may  be
less  virulent  than in the early  days of independence  where  nationbuilding  has21
made some  progress. Finally,  there  is a growing  perception  among  donors  that
democracy  need  not  conflict  with  responsible  macroeconomic  management  and  macket-
orier.zed  economic  reform,  as many  had  assumed  during  the  realpolitik  1960s  and
1970s.16  Indeed, Eastern Europe has  enthralled the world  with  speedy,
simultaneous  leaps  toward  multi-party  democracy  and liberal  economy.
Economic  Governance
In the future, the Bretton  Woods agencies should  consider  developing
minimal  conditions  regarding  economic  governance  which,  if  not  met,  will  result
in  a  curtailment  of  lending.  So  as  not  to  contradict  the  "non-political"  clauses
in the institutions'  founding  charters,  such  conditions  could  be justified  on
grounds of  a  borrower's prospective efficiency and  credibility. 7 Such
conditions  could  also be consistent  with concerns  being  raised  within  Africa
itself,  where linkages  between  governance  style  and economic  performance  are
being  widely  noted.1 8
Rampant  official  corruption  is  one  critical  area  likely  to  be targeted  in
this  new list of "unacceptable  behaviors."  Among  the  donor  populace,  there  is
mounting  concern  that  foreign  assistance  is seemingly  wasted  on self-interested
16.  For  a fuller  discussion,  see  Joan  Nelson  and  contributors,  Fragile
Coalitions:  The  Politics  of Economic  Adjustment.  Washington,  D.C. and  New
Brunswick,  N.J.:  The Overseas  Development  Council  and  Transaction  Books,  1989.
17.  In the  past,  Fund  and  Bank lending  decisions  occasionally  were
influenced  by the  political  motives  of  major  shareholders,  and  their  economic
advice  can also  be seen  as ideologically  based.  But  these  "political"  motives
are  distinct  from  concern  for  the  domestic  political  practices  of  borrowing
states.  I am indebted  to  my colleague,  Joan  Nelson,  for  clarifying  for  me this
and  other  points  regarding  political  conditionality.
18.  For  example,  see  U.N.  Economic  Commission  for  Africa,  An  Afric
Alternative  Framework  to Structural  Adiustment  Programmes.22
governments  whose  behavior  is  antitherical  to their  own  values.  In  particular,
vocal,  well organized,  and  often  well informed  private  voluntary  organizations
are  among  those  most  critical  of official  assistance  to  kleptocratic  regimes  in
the  developing  world.
From  a purely  economic  perspective,  grors  corruption  often  makes  it  more
difficult  for governments  to implement  agreed  upon policies  and decreases  the
overall  efficiency  of resource  allocation. For private  investors,  arbitrary
and  capricious  implementation  of  government  regulations  adds  to  the  uncertainties
and headaches  of doing  business  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Indeed,  one serious
obstacle  to private  investment  and  growth  in  Africa  is that  everything  is open
to  negotiation  with government  officials.19
Reforms  targeted  at economic  governance  could  include:  more transparent
government  budgeting;  open  and  competitive  bidding  for  large  public  investment
projects;  accountability  of  management  of state-owned  enterprises;  and greater
consistency  in the implementation  of regulations  governing  itivestment.  Such
conditionality  might  raise serious  questions  regarding  programs  in countries
such  as Ethiopia  and  Zaire,  where  a  World  Bank  annual  report  boasted  of  positive
net transfers  of $211  million  and $340  million,  respectively,  during  FY 1985-
89,  but is a  necessary  remedy  nonetheless. 20
Even in circumstances  of gross  misgovernance,  however,  lending  agencies
may want to sustain  modest  core  programs  in order  to  maintain  some  continuity
and  presence.  In the  long  run,  it  would  be perverse  and  even  counterproductive
to  punish  poor  people  within  a country  because  of the  practices  of a  government
19.  This is the  opinion  of one  acute  observer  of the  African  scene. See
Carol  Lancaster,  "Reform  or Else?",  Africa  Report,  July-August,  1990.
20.  World  Bank,  Annual  Report,  1989,  p.112.23
which  is already victimizing  them. In particular,  Bank support for basic
education  and  human  capital-building  efforts  could  help  prepare  a  population  to
better  hold its government  accountable  to the popular  will.  The Bank should
therefore proceed with  sound basic needs projects, unless it  feels the
malfeasance  to be so rife in those  very sectors  as to preclude  any efficient
expenditure  of funds.
Beyond  issues  of economic  governance,  there  are  pressures  for  the  Bank  to
take into  account  such political  matters  as popular  participation  and multi.-
party  democracy.  Tackling  such  concerns  could  further  complicate  conditionality
and in some instances  arguably  contradict  the mandates  of the Bretton  Woods
institutions.  Frequently, other  official agencies and  non-governmental
organizations  will  be  better  equipped  to  promote  these  laudable  goals.  But  there
are  ways for  the  Bank and  Fund  to address  these  issues  with a positive  agenda.
Again, education --  whether through primary schooling  or the training  of
economists  --  lays the foundation  for intelligent  political  participation.
Public  debate  can  also  be stimulated  by funding  local  social  science  research
institutes  and  by the release  of certain  Bank and  Fund documents  that  discuss
country economic conditions.  Furthermore,  as is occuring  with increasing
frequency,  Fund  missions  can  seek  the  opinions  of an array  of non-governmental
organizations  and  the  Bank  can  involve  NGOs in  the  design  and  implementation  of
projects.  By undertaking  such affirmative  initiatives,  the Bretton Woods
agencies  would  be better  prepared  to  deflect  pressures  for  a sanctions  approach
to  promoting  political  reform.
The  introduction  of political objectives  carries a  clear danger of
partisanship,  cultural  arrogance,  and  hubris.  There is also a clear  tension
between  the  well-founded  desire  to  reduce  the  complexity  of conditional'ty  and24
the emerging interest in adding conditions  regarding equity and economic
go-ernance. The policy  quandaries  will be multiplied  by cases  where regimes
pass one or two  but  not all  key tests,  e.g.,  a regime  with efficient  economic
policies,  generally  good  governance  but  little  concern  for  equity. Nevertheless,
the Bretton  Woods agencies  will not  be able to escape  these  dilemmas  in the
1990s.  The prudent course  is to ccnfront  these issues  directly  --  however
conceptually  difficult  and  politically  sensitive  --  and  to devise  clear  policy
guidelines. Rather  than  be caught  in a defensive,  reactive  mode,  the  Bank  and
Fund  should  seize  the  initiative  and  become  positive  forces  in  promoting  these
worthy  objectives.
IV.  Bank-Fund  Relations
As it presently  stands,  both agencies  are likely  to remain  involved  in
policy-based  lending  in  Sub-Saheran  Africa  for  the  foreseeable  future. For its
part, the  World  Bank is deeply  committed  to fostering  structural  reform.  In
turn,  the  ten-year  repayment  period  of the  ESAF/SAF  is  a strong  indication  that
the  Fund  will also  remain  in Africa  for  the  long  haul.  Furthermore,  ,Ln  light
of  the  region's  unstable  macroeconomics,  increasingly  volatile  politics,  and  the
present  inhospitable  external  environment,  Fund  advice  and  financing  are  likely
to  be in demand  in the  1990s. 21
Given  the  strong  probability  of this  mutually  extended  presence,  the  Fund
and  the  Bank  will  want  to  collaborate  closely  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. In  tackling
the  various  issues  discussed  in  this  paper,  as  well  as  many  others,  the  Bretton
21.  Fund  staffing  patterns  have  been sticky,  however,  and  have  not
adjusted  adequately  to this  institutional  commitment  to  Africa. Staff  in the
African  bureau  are  spread  very thin,  suggesting  that  their  numbers  ought  to  be
augmented.25
Woods sisters  will need to synchronize  policies  in order to increase  their
effectiveness,  and  at  times  devise  a  division  of  labor  in  order  to  avoid  wasteful
duplication  of effort.  At the very least,  policies  should  be sufficiently
coordinated  so as  not to send  contradictory  signals  to  African  officials.
In  Africa  as  elsewhere,  the  IMF's  extended  iacilities  and  the  World  Bank's
policy-based  lending  have  often  resulted  in  substantial  overlap  in  jurisdictions.
The Policy  Framework  Papers (PFPs)  are an effort to address this issue  by
assuring  coherence  between  Bank and Fund  programs  in a multi-year  framework.
In point  of fact,  Bank and  Fund  staff  do  work  well together  in some  countries,
and  recent  efforts  by country  teams  to  compare  scenarios  and  projections  and  to
reconcile  differences  are  encouraging.  Still,  much  remains  to  be done  to  assure
that  PFPs are  more than  a cut-and-paste  exercise.  To  routinize  cooperation,
medium-term  country  programs  should  be designed  by joint Bank-Fund  missions.
The  current  practices  of  including  'across  the  street"  representatives  in  mission
teams  and  "parallel  missions"  that  are  in-country  at  the  same  time,  are  positive
steps in this direction,  though even these depend too much on individual
personalities  to guarantee  coherent  programs.
Such collaboration  will proceed  more smoothly  if it is clear that one
instituUion  has the  lead.  In Sub-Saharan  Africa,  it  makes  sense  for  the  World
Bank,  not the  IMF, to take  the lead in  organizing  external  assistance  efforts
and policy  reform  programs.  This approach  would  be consistent  with the 1989
decision  to  give  the  World  Bank  primacy  over  structural  matters,  though  it  ought
not to prevent  the  IMF from  continuing  to assist  on macroeconomic  problems  as
needed. Ideally,  the  result  of  this  division  of  labor  should  be  more  consistent
policy  advice and more efficient,  less time-consuming  dialogues  with member
governments.26
With regard  to resource  transfers,  it is acceptable  and even desirable
that IDA  increase its exposure in low-income  Africa vis-a-vis the  less
concessional  IBRD  and  IMF.  But  IDA  monies  should  not in effect  be recycled  to
the  IMF  at a time  when  many  African  countries  are  in  severe  financial  distress.
It is therefore  in the interest  of the  World Bank,  as well as of the  African
countries,  for  the  IMF  to cease  to  be a financial  drain  on Sub-Saharan  Africa.
In the area of debt,  the  Bank and Fund  have worked  closely  together  to
follow  the  outline  of the  Brady  proposals. But the  two  agencies  could  play  a
more dynamic  leadership  role  if  their  management  could  join  forces  in  proposing
amendments  to the Brady  proposals  that  would speed their  implementation. In
addition,  since the Fund  has as much an interest  as the Bank in erasing  the
commercial  debts  and  arrears  of  many  low-income  countries,  it  might  want  to  match
the  IBRD's  contribution  to the  new debt  reduction  facility.
Close collaboration  will be especially  important  in the  newly emerging
areas  of policy  conditionality:  economic  governance  and  social  equity.  Both  the
Fund and the Bank can take  economic  governance  into account  when considering
stand-bys  and  policy-based  loans,  since  the  commitment  and  credibility  of  grossly
corrupt  regimes  may  be in question. It  would  be embarrassing  for  the Fund to
be lending  to a regime  where the  World  Bank  had curtailed  lending  because  of
repeated  malfeasance.
The  Fund cannot,  however,  be expected  to deny  credit  to a  member  because
its stabilization  plans  are regressive. But Michel  Camdessus  has given  Fund
staff the  mandate to address  the social  costs  of stabilization  programs,  and
therefore  to  analyze  the  composition  of expenditures  and  incidence  of taxation
as they  affect  different  social  groups. As the  Fund  develops  these  capacities,
it will be better able to assist  receptive  governments  to design  equitable27
programs  --  and  to share  its  analysis  and  recommendations  with Bank  staff.
Finally,  it is  time  for  the  Bank  and  Fund  to engage  in long-term  planning
for  Sub-Saharan  Africa. PFPs should  go beyond  the  three-year  horizon  dictated
by the timetable  of Bank  and Fund  country  programs,  and look  out  five  and  even
10  years  for  some issues.  The  Bank  and  Fund  should  also  join  efforts  to  produce
region-wide  strategic  plans  for  this  decade  to guide  their  own  work  as well  as
to  give  clear  signals  and  realistic  expectations  to  the  region. Needless  to  say,
the  countries  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  should  play  major  roles  in  designing  these
programs,  which  would  so  vitally  affect  their  interests.28
Table l:  Projected  World  Bank  Resource  Flows  to Sub-Saharan  Africa,
1991-1994
(in  US$  millions)
1991  1992  1993  1994
IBRD
Commitments  3,297  3,700  3,300  2,617
Disbursements  1,493  2,064  2,013  1,957
Principal  Payments  800  879  894  944
Interest  PaymerLts  808  898  980  1,056
Net  Resource  Transfer  (115)  287  139  (43)
IDA
Commitments  4,995  3,700  3,300  2,617
Disbursements  3,201  3,721  3,748  3,563
Principal  Payments  71  95  123  158
Interest  Payments  142  170  197  225
Net  Resource  Transfer  2,988  3,456  3,428  3,180
IBRD - IDA
Commitments  8,292  7,400  6,600  5,234
Disbursements  4,694  5,785  5,761  5,520
Principal  Payments  871  974  1,017  1,102
Interest  Payments  950  1,068  1,177  1,281
Net  Resource  Transfer  2,873  3,743  3,567  3,137
Source: Author  estimates  based  on  World  Bank  OPMIS  Database  and  projections.29
Table  2:  IMF  Resource  Flows  to Sub-Saharan  Africa,  1980-89
(in  US$  millions)
....................................................................................
1980  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Purchases  _  1,217  1,152  1,618  952  738  735  650  990  772
Repurchases  384  266  401  591  769  1,217  1,216  1,215  1,190
IMF  Charges  103  296  338  402  402  472  326  267  255
Net  Transfers  730  590  879  (41)  (433)  (954)  (892)  (492)  (673)
Source: World  Debt  Tables  1989-90  (Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank,  1989),  p. 82.
International  Financial  Statistics  (Washington,  D.C.:  International  Monetary
Fund,  August  1990),  pp.  18,  30,  32.3n
Table 3
BNRANCED  STRUCTURAL  ADJUSTMENT  FACILITY
STATUS OF  LOAN ARRANGEMENTS  1/
as at December 31, 1990
(In millions of SDR)
Date of  Amount  Undrawn
Member  Arrangement  agreed  balance
Bangladesh  Aug. 10, 1990  .58.8  215.7
Bolivia  July 27, 1988  90.7  45.3
Gambia, The  Nov. 23, 1988  17.1  3.4
Ghana  Nov. 9, 1986  265.9  96.0
Guyana  July 13, 1990  47.1  14.7
Kenya  May 15, 1989  170.4  60.5
Madagascar  May 15, 1989  43.7  31.9
Malawi  July 15, 1988  29.8  5.6
Mauritania  May 24, 1989  44.1  30.5
Mozambique  June 1, 1990  85.4  76.3
Niger  Dec. 12, 1988  43.9  27.0
Senegal  Nov. 21, 1988  127.7  37.1
Togo  May 31, 1989  26.9  15.4
Uganda  Apr. 17, 1989  159.4  77.2
TOTAL  1,410.5  736.3
1/Resources  under  Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility
Arrangements may be provided from the Adjustment Facility within
the Special Disbursement Account and from the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility Trust.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Financial Statements of the
General Department of the SDR Department and Accounts Administered
by  the  IMP,  (Washington,  D.C.:  International  Monetary  Fund,
December 1990), p. 60.31
Table  4
COUNTRY  ARREARS TO THE  IMF  AS  OF  JANUARY 31,  1990
(In  millions of SDR)
Longest overdue
Member  Ttl  obligation
Kampuchea, Democratic  30.1  March 1975
Liberia  305.2  January 1985
Panama  181.2  December 1987
Peru  624.9  December 1985
Sierra Leone  69.0  January 1987
Somalia  111.7  July 1987
Sudan  895.3  July 1984
Viet Nam  46.4  February 1984
Zambia  882.4  June 1986
Source: International Monetary Fund, Financial Statements of the
General Department and the SDR Department and Accounts  Administered
by  the  IMF,  (Washington,  D.C.s  International  Monetary  Fund,
December, 1990), p. 16.32
Table  5:  Debt Structure  of Sub-Saharan  Africa,  1988
(in  US$  millions)
I  I  |  private
Country  I all  debt I  private  las  % of all
Benin  1,055  362  34.31
Botswana  499  28  5.57
Burkina  Faso  866  34  3.93
Burundi  793  20  2.52
Cameroon  4,229  1,032  24.40
Cape  Verde  133  3  2.11
Central  African  Republic  673  24  3.57
Chad  346  38  11.06
Comoros  199  0  0.10
Congo,  People's  Republic  4,763  2,086  43.80
Cote  d'Ivoire  14,125  6,980  49.42
Djibouti  183  1  0.71
Equatorial  Guinea  200  9  4.25
Ethiooia  2,978  461  15.48
Gabon  2,663  798  29.97
Gambia  327  26  7.95
Ghana  3,099  260  8.39
Guinea  2,563  213  8.31
Guinea-Bissau  423  88  20.69
Kenya  5,888  1,294  21.98
Lesotho  281  22  7.82
Liberia  1,632  201  12.32
Madagascar  3,602  312  8.66
Malawi  1,349  52  3.85
Mali  2,067  27  1.31
Mauritania  2,076  111  5.35
Mauritius  861  176  20.44
Mozambique  4,406  984  22.33
Niger  1,742  356  20.44
Nigeria  30,718  17,982  58.54
Rwanda  632  7  1.17
Sao  Tome & Principe  99  1  0.61
Senegal  3,617  209  5.78
Seychelles  159  30  18.86
Sierra  Leone  727  95  13.07
Somalia  2,035  34  1.67
Sudan  11,853  1,804  15.22
Swaziland  265  10  3.81
Tanzania  4,729  276  5.84
Togo  1,210  54  4.46
Uganda  1,925  107  5.56
Zaire  8,475  700  8.26
Zambia  6,498  523  8.05
Zimbabwe  2,659  1,060  39.86
TOTAL  139,622 !  38,890  27.85
Source: World  Debt Tables  1989-90  (Washington  D.C.:  World  Bank,  1989),  Vol. II.PRE  Workina  Paper  Series
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